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1  Introduction  
The global food crisis of 2007-08 has focused attention on food prices, pushing the topic to 
the  top  of  the  agenda  of  international  organizations.  For  policymakers  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa,  however,  food  prices  have  been  an  issue  of  economic  importance  and  political 
sensitivity for decades.   Of particular importance are the prices of staple foods, defined as 
grains  and  starchy  root  crops  that  are  inexpensive  sources  of  calories.  In  eastern  and 
southern Africa, maize is the most important staple food, followed by cassava, sorghum, 
teff, wheat, plantains, and sweet potatoes, with the importance of each varying by country.  
The importance of these staple foods cannot be underestimated, as they contribute 50-75% 
of the caloric intake of the population. Furthermore, staple foods represent a large share of 
food spending, which is itself 40-70% of the budgets of households in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The  impact  of  changes  in  staple  food  prices  varies  across  types  of  households  within 
countries.  The urban poor are particularly vulnerable to price increases because staples 
make up a larger share of their budgets.  Less obvious but equally important, a large number 
of  rural  households,  a  majority  in  some  countries,  are  also  net  buyers  of  staple  foods. 
Earning  their  income  from  cash  crops,  agricultural  labor,  small  business  income,  or 
remittances, they are also adversely affected by higher staple food prices.  On the other 
hand, net sellers of staple food prices gain from higher food prices.  Although they represent 
a minority of the rural population, perhaps 10-40%, they are a vocal minority, often playing 
a key role in farmer organizations and local politics.   
Given the impact of staple food prices on well-being and food security, particularly among 
the  poor,  it  is  not  surprising  that  food  prices  are  such  a  politically  sensitive  topic  in 
developing  countries  and  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  in  particular.    Price  instability  and  food 
shortages have serious food security implications and can erode the political support for the 
government.  The global food crisis of 2007-08 provoked food riots in more than a dozen 
countries,  including  Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon,  Senegal,  Mauritania,  Cote  d'Ivoire, 
Mozambique, and South Africa.  Policymakers have a strong motivation to use any and all 
tools at their disposal to manage staple food prices,  regardless of whether their goal is 
poverty reduction or political survival.   
Many of the agricultural policies and programs implemented by governments in developing 
countries are designed to support agricultural prices for farmers, hold down food prices for 
consumers, and reduce volatility in both. In order to achieve these objectives, governments 
in  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  elsewhere  have  implemented  price  controls,  interventions  by 
state-owned grain marketing boards, import tariffs and restrictions, export taxes and bans, 
restrictions on movement of food within the country, state-owned farms, crop production 
campaigns, input subsidies, and agricultural credit programs, among others.  Longer-term 
investments such as roads, market places, agricultural research, and extension systems may 
be implemented in part to improve staple crop marketing.  
Food policies will have the best chance of achieving their objectives if they are based on a 
solid understanding of the functioning of food markets in the country and a familiarity with 
the  experience  of  different  policies  in  other  countries.    This  is  the  premise  behind  the 
African Agricultural Marketing Project (AAMP), managed by the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA).  The objective of the AAMP is to “provide policy-relevant Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 2 
 
analysis,  promote  empirically  based  policy  dialogue  among  public  and  private  sector 
stakeholders,  and  build  capacity  to  analyze,  formulate  and  implement  growth-oriented 
agricultural trade policies.”  The AAMP is carrying out six policy seminars and short-training 
courses of selected topics related to food security and agricultural markets.  This report is a 
synthesis of papers prepared for the third policy seminar, which is organized around the 
topic  “Price  variability:  Causes,  consequences,  and  policy  implications.”    In  particular,  it 
summarizes the findings of three thematic papers and seven country background papers.  
The titles are listed below, while the full citations are available in the reference section at 
the end of this synthesis.  
  “Maize price instability in eastern and southern Africa: The impact of trade barriers and 
market intervention”   
  “Are staple food markets efficient in Africa? Spatial price analysis and beyond”   
  “Transmission  of  world  food  price  changes  to  African  markets  and  its  effect  on 
household welfare” 
  “Staple food prices in Ethiopia” 
  “Staple food prices in Uganda” 
   “Staple food prices in Kenya” 
   “Staple food prices in Tanzania” 
  “Staple food prices in Zambia” 
  “Staple food prices in Malawi” 
  “Staple food prices in Mozambique” 
Following  this  introduction,  Section  2  provides  a  framework  for  understanding  price 
variation, both between different locations and over time.   Sections 3-5 summarize the 
findings of the three thematic papers.  Section 3 reviews the patterns of spatial variation in 
staple food prices within sub-Saharan African countries.  Section 4 analyzes the effect of 
global  food  markets  on  domestic  food  prices  in  Africa.  Section  5  analyzes  maize  price 
volatility in eastern and southern Africa, focusing on the effect of government stabilization 
efforts. Section 6 provides an overview of the seven country papers. And Section 7 identifies 
some of the implications of these findings for staple food policy in the region.   
2  Framework for understanding variation in food prices  
In  a  well-functioning  market,  prices  reflect  the  relative  scarcity  of  the  commodity,  so, 
variations in prices reflect differences in scarcity.  Price differences create opportunities for 
arbitrage, in which traders buy from low-price markets to sell in higher-price markets.  In 
doing so, they reduce the scarcity in the high-price markets and increase scarcity in low-
price markets, which has the effect of reducing the price in the former and raising the price 
in  the  latter.  In  the  process  of  attempting  to  profit  from  the  price  difference,  traders 
paradoxically tend to reduce the price difference below what it would have been without 
trade.    Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 3 
 
It is useful to distinguish between price variation across different locations (spatial variation) 
and price variation over time (temporal variation).  Although the process of arbitrage is 
similar in both cases, the causes of price variation differ.  Each is discussed below. 
2.1  Spatial variation in staple food prices  
As discussed in Rashid and Minot (2009), the patterns of spatial variation in food prices in a 
country depend partly on whether or not the commodity is internationally traded:   
  For  non-tradable  food  commodities,  areas  producing  large  surpluses  of  the 
commodity  (those  with  good  agricultural  potential  relative  to  the  size  of  the 
population) tend to have the lowest prices.
1 Examples of surplus maize areas include 
Jimma  in  Ethiopia,  the  western  highl ands  in  Kenya,  the  southern  highlands  in 
Tanzania, and northern Mozambique.  In contrast, cities and other deficit areas have 
higher food prices in order to cover the cost of shipping food from surplus zones.    
  For tradable commodities, prices will generally depend on distance from the port of 
entry or exit. Imported food will be least expensive near the port of entry or along 
the main transport routes.  For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, rice and wheat are 
generally least expensive at the port city or in places with good market access.     
Spatial arbitrage refers to the process in which traders buy in low-price locations and sell in 
higher-priced locations.  In competitive markets, spatial arbitrage has three implications: 
  First, spatial arbitrage ensures that the price difference between two markets will 
be, in the long run, no greater than the transfer cost, defined as the full cost of 
shipping  the  commodity  from  one  market  to  another  including  profit  and 
compensation for risk.  If the price difference were  temporarily greater than the 
transfer cost, traders would buy from the low-price market and sell to the high-price 
market, thus reducing the price difference.   
  Second, spatial arbitrage implies that, if there is a flow between two markets, the 
price difference will be approximately equal to the transfer cost.  To keep the flow 
going, the price difference must be large enough to cover the cost of trading. 
  And  finally,  spatial  arbitrage  implies  that,  if  the  price  difference  between  two 
markets is less than transfer costs, there will be no private trade of the commodity 
between the two markets.  In this situation, trade between the two markets is not 
profitable.  For example, if the government sets pan-territorial prices or subsidizes 
the shipment of food from surplus to deficit regions, the private sector will withdraw 
from trade.   
Thus, although food traders carry out spatial arbitrage for their own profit, it has socially 
beneficial effects in moving food from surplus to deficit areas and reducing the gap between 
food prices in different locations.  
Where there are trade flows between markets, the difference between the prices is more or 
less constant, so the prices will move up and down together.  In economic terms, this is 
called market integration or spatial co-integration of prices.  When there is no trade flow 
                                                      
1   Spatial differences in demand also matter, but usually there is less variation in per capita consumption of 
staple foods than in per capita production of staple foods.     Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 4 
 
between markets, the prices in each market will not move together, unless they are linked 
by another factor such as similar rainfall patterns or trade with a third market. 
Spatial  arbitrage  applies  to  different  markets  within  a  country  as  well  as  to  markets  in 
different countries, although there are some differences.  One important difference is that 
the barriers to trade between countries is generally greater than the barriers to trade within 
a country.  International trade is subject to tariffs, quantitative restrictions, occasional bans, 
sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, foreign exchange controls, and other regulations.  
Internal barriers to trade, common in the 1970s and 1980s, have been largely eliminated, 
though  local  taxes  and  police  checkpoints  continue  in  some  countries.    Regional 
organizations such as Comesa and the East African Community are attempting to reduce 
international barriers between members, but this is a continuing challenge.   
Another difference between domestic and international arbitrage is that internal shipments 
take no more than a few days to accomplish, while an international transaction may take 
more than a month to complete. Thus, we expect food prices to respond more quickly to 
changes in nearby domestic food markets than to changes in world food markets. 
2.2  Temporal variation in staple food prices  
As described in Minot (2009c), the variation in food prices over time (temporal variation) 
also depends on whether or not the commodity is internationally traded:   
  For  tradable  food  commodities,  the  variation  in  prices  over  time  is  largely 
determined by world prices, trade policy, and the exchange rate.  If trade policy and 
the exchange rate remain unchanged, the domestic price of a tradable commodity 
will  generally  track  the  international  price  of  the  commodity.    However,  import 
quotas,  high  tariffs,  exchange  rate  volatility,  or  difficulty  in  accessing  foreign 
exchange can break the link between domestic and international commodity prices.  
  For non-tradable food commodities, the variation in prices over time is primarily 
caused  by  the  seasonal  harvest  calendar  and  by  weather-related  differences  in 
production from year to year.
2   Seasonal prices are lowest during the harvest and 
rise throughout the post -harvest period in order to cover the cost of storage.  
Similarly, year-to-year variation in staple fo od prices is inversely related to the 
harvest.  Because farmers and consumers can switch between staple foods in 
response to prices, the prices of different staple foods often move together over 
time. 
Temporal arbitrage refers to the process of storing a c ommodity when the price is low  in 
order to sell it  when the price is higher.   The implications of temporal arbitrage are quite 
similar to those of spatial arbitrage:   
  First, temporal arbitrage ensures that the expected price increase between two time 
period will be, in general, no greater than the full cost of storage, including profit and 
compensation for risk.  If the expected price increase were temporarily greater than 
the storage cost, traders would have an incentive to buy and store more of the 
commodity, thus raising the current price (when the commodity is less scarce) and 
                                                      
2   Again, changes in demand can affect food prices, particularly for some specialty foods linked to holidays, but 
changes in demand are usually not an important cause of variation in staple food prices.  Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 5 
 
lowering the expected later price (when it is more scarce).  This reduces food price 
variability over time. 
  Second,  temporal  arbitrage  implies  that,  if  there  is  a  storage  between  two  time 
periods, the expected price increase will be approximately equal to the storage cost.  
To maintain the incentive to store, the monthly price increase must be enough to 
cover the monthly cost of storage. 
  And finally, temporal arbitrage implies that, if the expected price increase from one 
time period to another is less than storage costs, there will be no storage undertaken 
by private traders because storage would not be profitable.  For example, if the 
government  sets  pan-seasonal  prices  or  subsidizes  the  inter-seasonal  storage  of 
grains, the private sector will withdraw from seasonal storage.   
Traders who undertake this type of operation are often accused of “hoarding” and profiting 
from a food crisis. Indeed, traders do undertake storage with the goal of making a profit, but 
the  outcome  is  often  socially  beneficial.    If  food  is  plentiful  and  cheap  at  harvest  but 
expensive and scarce in the off-season, it is desirable for someone to store food now and 
sell it onto the market later. Likewise, if the next harvest is expected to be poor, it is useful 
to hold some stocks for the off-season after the poor harvest. In either case, the effect is to 
redistribute food from a low-scarcity period to a higher-scarcity period and to reduce the 
variability in food prices below what it would have been without storage.   
There are two important differences between spatial and temporal arbitrage.  First, spatial 
arbitrage  can  take  place  in  either  direction  between  two  locations,  while  storage  can 
transfer goods from the present to the future, but not the reverse.  Second, spatial arbitrage 
is  motivated  by  the  actual  difference  in  prices  between  two  locations,  while  temporal 
arbitrage is based on the expected increase in prices between two time periods
3.  For this 
reason, temporal arbitrage is much riskier, so we would expect the risk premium (the profit 
necessary to compensate for the risk) to be much higher in the case of temporal arbitrage. 
Because  storage  decisions  are  base d  on  expected  prices,  expected  future  events  can 
influence current prices. For example, if traders learn that the next grain harvest will be a 
poor one, they will have an  incentive to put more grain into storage for resale during  the 
high-price period after the next harvest.  By withdrawing grain from the market today, they 
increase the current price, but by increasing the supply of stored grain available later on, 
they will partially alleviate the scarcity during that period and reduce food price differences 
between the two years.     
Changes in expectations about the harvest, the size of government stocks, or the volumes 
being imported can have dramatic effects on current prices.  This is because staple food 
crops have very inelastic supply and demand, meaning that a given price change causes only 
a small percentage change in the quantities consumed and produced.  Inelastic demand is 
related to the urgent need to maintain a basic level of caloric intake, combined with the lack 
of other foods that are as che ap on a per-calorie basis.  Inelastic supply is the result of 
seasonal supply (between harvests, the supply is fixed) and the subsistence -orientation of 
                                                      
3   In fact, the difference is a little more subtle because spatial arbitrage is based on the expected price of the 
commodity at the time it is delivered to its destination. Delivery may take just a day or two for domestic trade 
but more than a month for international trade.   Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 6 
 
most staple food production.  When supply and demand are inelastic, a small change in 
actual or expected supply results in a large change in the market price. 
In summary, when food markets are characterized by competition and good information, 
they work well in redistributing food from low-price markets to higher-price markets and 
from  low-price  periods  to  high-price  periods.  In  doing  so,  they  tend  to  reduce  spatial 
variation in food prices, as well as reducing price variability over time.  However, markets 
will not eliminate all price variation across market or over time.  Indeed, the elimination of 
price variation would cost more than the social benefits, as well destroying the incentives 
necessary to attract private agents to engage in trade.  
However,  food  markets  may  be  inefficient  due  to  monopolistic  behavior,  imperfect 
competition,  policy  inconsistency,  and/or  high  transportation  costs.  Furthermore,  even 
when  food  markets  work  well,  they  cannot  be  expected  to  address  all  food  security 
problems, such as delivering food to households whose livelihoods and purchasing power 
have  been  destroyed  by  natural  disasters.    These  have  implications  for  the  role  of 
government, which are discuss in below in Section 7.1.  The next three sections apply the 
concepts from this section in the  empirical analysis of variation in staple food prices in 
eastern and southern Africa.   
3  Spatial variation in staple food prices  
Do staple food prices in nearby markets in sub-Saharan Africa move together and what does 
this tell us about the efficiency of staple food markets?  This section summarizes the 
findings of Rashid and Minot (2009), including a discussion of the relationship between 
market integration and market efficiency, a summary of studies of spatial market 
integration in Africa, and a discussion of factors that affect the cost of transportation and 
marketing in the region.   
3.1  Spatial integration of markets in Africa 
As defined in section 2.1, spatial market integration refers to the co-movement of prices 
different locations. In contrast, market efficiency refers to minimizing cost and not leaving 
any  opportunities  for  mutually  beneficial  trade  unexploited.  Although  the  concepts  are 
closely linked, it is possible for efficient markets not to be integrated if the price difference 
between the two markets is less than the marketing cost between them.  In other words, 
segmented markets may well be efficient.  At the same time, spatially integrated markets 
may  not  be  efficient  if  marketing  costs  are  higher  than  normal  due  to  imperfect 
competition, lack of information, or other reasons.   
The  methods  for  measuring  market  integration  have  improved  over  time,  taking  into 
account exogenous factors, lagged effects, and the problem of non-stationary variables
4.  
Cointegration analysis takes non-stationarity into account and allows measurement of the 
long-run relationship and the speed of adjustment, but it does not distinguish between lack 
of integration due to market inefficiency and lack of integration due to the price difference 
being too small to justify   trade.  Threshold autoregression (TAR) and the parity bound 
                                                      
4   Non-stationary variables are those that do not have a constant mean and variance, such as those following a 
“random walk” pattern.  This poses a problem because standard regression analysis will give misleading results 
when applied to stationary variables.  Price data are often non-stationary.   Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 7 
 
method (PBM) address this problem, particularly if outside information on transfer costs can 
be obtained.  
Based on our review of studies of the spatial integration of food markets in sub-Saharan 
Africa, we can draw four conclusions: 
  Food grains prices in most of the markets within each country are co-integrated, though 
the degree of integration varies with distance and road quality. Markets that are not co-
integrated are usually those that are more remote or off the main roads.  
  The speed of adjustment varies widely across studies, ranging from just one week to six 
months.  However, recent studies that use weekly price data indicate that half of the full 
adjustment takes place within 1-4 weeks.   
  There  is  no  consensus on the  symmetry of price  transmission.   One  study of  maize 
markets in Ghana found asymmetry in Ghana, possibly indicating trader collusion, but 
another  study  found  symmetric  price  transmission  in  maize  markets  in  Malawi, 
indicating competitive markets.   
  Most of the studies that examine the impact of market liberalization find statistically 
significant  evidence  of  improved  market  integration  after  reforms.    The  exception 
(Benin) represents a case in which pre-reform food markets were not heavily regulated. 
3.2  Factors affecting marketing costs  
Marketing costs can be decomposed into transportation costs and trader profits, including 
compensation for risks. Studies of marketing costs suggest that transportation costs account 
for more than half of marketing costs.   
The cost of transport is significantly higher in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere, due to a 
combination of poor roads, high fuel prices, and administrative procedures which cause 
delays.  The cost is US$ 0.04 - 0.10 per km-ton for long-distance road transport and US$ 0.10 
- 0.40 per km-ton for shorter-distance transport.  In contrast, the cost of road transport is 
US$ 0.03 - 0.04 in Pakistan and OECD countries.  Transport costs vary widely within Africa as 
well, being lowest in southern Africa and highest in western and central Africa. 
There is fragmentary but widespread evidence that transport costs have declined over the 
past decade due to market liberalization, infrastructure investments, and better access to 
information thanks to mobile phones. 
The efficiency of food markets is affected by a variety of factors: 
  Barriers to trade in agriculture.  District-level taxes, check points, tariffs, and non-tariff 
barriers to trade raise the cost of food to remote deficit areas and landlocked countries. 
  Degree of competition in the transport sector.  Countries and areas within countries 
with less dense demand for transport services tend to have lower transport costs, due in 
part to lower competition. 
  Access  to  information.  Although  difficult  to  measure,  one  study  showed  that  the 
adoption of mobile phones cut spatial price margins by 6%.                             
  Effectiveness of the legal system.  The difficulty of enforcing contracts in developing 
countries  results  in  additional  marketing  costs  as  traders  personally  inspect  their 
purchases and carry out face-to-face transactions.  Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 8 
 
  Quality of transport infrastructure.  Studies show that poor-quality roads can double the 
cost of transportation, reduce trade volumes, and reduce the prices farmers receive. 
  Regulation of the transport sector.  Marketing costs are generally increased by state 
transportation  monopolies,  administratively-set  freight  rates,  regulations  favoring 
domestic transporters, and the proliferation of check points.  
  Government  interventions  in  food  markets.  Pubic  stocks  are  necessary  to  meet 
emergency needs, but unpredictable purchases and sales by the government introduce 
uncertainty into grain markets, raising costs and often increasing price volatility.   
  Trade and macroeconomic policy. Grain prices have spiked above import parity due to 
foreign  exchange  controls,  high  tariffs,  and  uncertainty  about  public-sector  import 
intentions.   
Overall,  it  appears  that  grain  markets  are  reasonably  efficient  given  the  difficult 
environment  in  which  they  operate,  but  they  are  constrained  by  poor  infrastructure, 
administrative  and  tariff  barriers,  a  high  degree  of  risk  and  uncertainty,  and  limited 
information.  In some cases, price differences may be significantly higher than transfer costs, 
particularly in remote areas, but the best way to reduce margins is to address the root 
causes (poor infrastructure, risk, and lack of information) rather than by regulating prices or 
having state enterprises compete with traders. The policy implications of these findings are 
discussed in Section 7.2. 
4  Transmission of food price shocks from world markets  
To what degree are changes in world food prices transmitted to domestic markets in sub-
Saharan Africa?  This section summarizes the results of Minot (2009c).  The study is divided 
into three parts.  The first part is an examination of the trends in staple food prices in sub-
Saharan Africa over 2007-08. The second is an econometric analysis of price transmission 
from international markets to domestic markets in Africa.  And the third part is a discussion 
to reconcile the apparently contradictory results.  
4.1  Recent trends in staple food prices in sub-Saharan Africa 
Staple food prices in sub-Saharan Africa have risen rapidly since 2006, even in US dollar 
terms.    Across  83  food  prices  in  eleven  countries  examined  in  this  report,  the  average 
increase between June 2007 and June 2008 was 63% in US dollar terms.  On average, this 
represents 71% of the increase in the price on international markets for the corresponding 
commodities.  There is, however, considerable variation across countries and commodities.  
For example, food price increases were relatively small (25-39%) in South Africa, Ghana, and 
Cameroon.    On  the  other  hand,  food  prices  increases  were  quite  large  (over  150%)  in 
Ethiopia and Malawi.  Since the price increases in these latter two countries actually exceed 
the  price  increase  in  the  world  markets  for  the  same  commodities,  this  suggests  that 
domestic factors (such as inflation, crop failure, or manipulation of the exchange rate) must 
have played an important role in the price hike.  The price increases in domestic African 
markets also varied by commodity.  The price increases in African markets were highest for 
maize  (87%),  wheat  (65%),  and  rice  (62%).    Other  commodities  experienced  smaller 
increases,  particularly  plantains  (9%)  and  cassava  (12%).    The  degree  of  price  increase 
appears to be roughly related to the degree of tradability: highly tradable commodities are 
more closely linked to international markets and so domestic prices of these commodities Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 9 
 
tracked the spike in world prices.  Commodities that are less widely traded in international 
markets saw smaller price increases in African markets.   
4.2  Econometric analysis of price transmission from international food markets 
The above analysis is based on the simple ratio of local to international price increases over 
June 2007 to June 2008.  We also carried out an econometric analysis of the degree to 
which local prices track world prices using a vector error-correction model.  The data consist 
of 62 price series for maize, rice, and wheat in nine sub-Saharan African countries.  Each 
domestic price series is tested against the world price of the same commodity.   
Based on the Johansen test, only 13 of the 62 price series show a long-run relationship in 
which the domestic price is influenced by the international price of the same commodity.  
Of the 13 domestic prices that show a long-run relationship with international prices, only 
six have an long-term elasticity of transmission that is statistically significant.  These six 
elasticities range from 0.16 to 0.97, with a median value of 0.54.  The median value implies 
that  54%  of  a  percentage  change  in  international  prices  would  be  transmitted  to  the 
domestic price of the same commodity.   
Although less than a third of the 62 African prices tested showed a statistically significant 
link to international prices, there was some variation in the proportion across countries and 
commodities.  Malawi, Mozambique, and Ethiopia have the highest proportion of prices that 
are linked to world markets, though the share is less than 40% in all three cases.  Zambia, 
Uganda, and Kenya have no prices that show a long-run relationship with world markets.     
The differences across commodities are somewhat clearer.  Just 10% of the domestic maize 
prices tested are significantly related to world maize prices, but almost half of the domestic 
rice prices are related to world rice prices.  This implies that rice markets in Africa are 
generally  better  connected  to  world  markets  than  maize  markets.    This  result  in  not 
surprising in light of the fact that most sub-Saharan African countries are close to self-
sufficient  in  maize,  but  rely  heavily  on  imported  rice  to  meet  local  demand.    More 
specifically,  the  traded  volume  of  maize  is  equivalent  to  less  than  5%  of  the  domestic 
consumption  in  eight  of  the  nine  countries  under  consideration;  the  exception  is 
Mozambique, where maize imports are equivalent to 14% of domestic production.  Among 
the three countries whose rice prices were tested, rice imports represent more than 50% of 
domestic consumption in Ghana and Mozambique and 11% in Tanzania. 
4.3  Discussion  
A key question is how to reconcile the trend analysis, which shows almost all domestic 
African prices rising apparently in response to the global food crisis of 2008-09, and the 
econometric analysis, which suggests that often there is no relationship between world 
prices and domestic African prices for the same commodities.  There are several possible 
explanations for this. 
First, unlike normal fluctuation in world food prices, the food crisis coincided with a sharp 
increase in oil prices, which rose from US$ 71 per barrel in June 2007 to US$ 133 per barrel a 
year  later  (see  Error!  Reference  source  not  found.).    This  led  to  much  higher  costs  of 
fertilizer,  sea-freight,  and  overland  transportation,  which  would  raise  the  cost  of 
domestically  produced  and  imported  food.    Since  fuel  costs  represent  less  than  half  of 
transportation cost, and transportation costs generally account for up to half of imported 
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grain costs.  Thus, higher fuel costs may be an important contributing factor, but it is not be 
enough to explain the full increase in African staple food prices. 
Second, the food crisis provoked a wave of grain export restrictions in sub-Saharan Africa, as 
well as elsewhere.  As mentioned above, during the global food crisis, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Tanzania all banned the export of maize, while several western African countries attempted 
to ban  grain  exports  with  varying  degrees  of  success.  Although  the effect  is  difficult to 
quantify, these restrictions probably raised grain prices in landlocked countries.   
Third,  the  higher  food  and  oil  prices  may  have  started  an  inflationary  process  in  some 
countries,  an  occurrence  that  normal  fluctuations  in  food  prices  does  not  cause.    With 
market-determined  exchange  rates,  the  depreciation  would  largely  offset  the  inflation, 
leaving prices as we measured them (in US dollar terms) relatively unchanged.  However, 
domestic inflation combined restrictions on the foreign currency market would drive up 
domestic African prices, in US dollar terms.  This could be part of the explanation in some 
countries,  such  as  Malawi  and  Ethiopia,  where  domestic  food  price  increases  actually 
exceeded world food price increases.  But in most countries, the increase in food prices was 
much greater than the increase in the general price level, as measured by the consumer 
price indices. 
Fourth, there may be threshold effects such that small changes in world food prices are not 
transmitted to African markets or their effects on African markets are not measurable given 
the price fluctuations due to variation in domestic supply.  Most of the African grain prices 
do show significant spikes that are not related to world prices and are presumably driven by 
poor harvests.  However, when the shock from international markets is large, as it was in 
2007-08, the price changes are transmitted to local markets or at least the transmission to 
local markets becomes measurable with econometric methods.   
In summary, the most likely explanation is that international prices of food grains do have 
an effect on African markets for rice, wheat, and (to a lesser degree) maize, but the effect is 
usually swamped by the dominant effect  of weather-related domestic supply shocks.  The 
spike in world prices in 2007-08 was more clearly transmitted, partly because it was a large 
shock, partly because it was accompanied by sharply higher transportation costs, and partly 
because many African countries attempted to ban grain exports in response to the emerging 
crisis,  thus  exacerbating  food  price  increases  in  landlocked  countries.    The  policy 
implications of these findings are discussed below in Section 7.3. 
5  Maize price instability and government intervention  
Staple food price instability remains a major problem in eastern and southern Africa. A 
number  of  governments  in  the  region  attempt  to  stabilize  food  prices  through  pricing, 
marketing and trade policy instruments.  This section summarizes a study by Chapoto and 
Jayne (2009), which examines the effect of trade policy and market interventions on maize 
price stability in eastern and southern Africa.  The study argues that trade policies and 
market interventions tend to be implemented in ad hoc, stop-go, and unpredictable ways 
that  can  generate  uncertainty  for  participants  in  the  marketing  system  and  create 
unintended consequences for the performance of food markets.  The result is that policies 
intended to reduce food price instability can instead be a source of price instability.  
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5.1  Methods 
This study assessed the impacts of various maize marketing and trade policy instruments on 
maize price unpredictability in  eastern and southern Africa. More specifically, the study 
applied an econometric model that estimates both the level and variability of monthly food 
prices  for  eight  countries  over  the  period  from  January  1994  to  December  2008
5.  The 
countries were divided into two categories.   Category A countries have fully embraced the 
maize-without-borders policy with a stable trade policy regime and a relatively predictable 
role for government  operations in domestic markets . Mozambique, Uganda, and South 
Africa fall into this group.  In contrast, category B countries use a variety of ad hoc domestic 
marketing and external trade policy tools to stabilize prices. Zambia, Malawi, Ethiopia and 
Tanzania are in this group. Kenya is a borderline case, falling in Category B until January 
2005 when the customs union of the East African Community came into operation, including 
its maize-without-borders policy.    
5.2  Results 
The results of the study can be summarized as follows. First, with the exception of Malawi, 
all  of  the  other  countries  pursuing  food  price  stabilization  and  food  security  objectives 
through  direct  state  operations  over  the  past  decade  have  not  been  able  to  match 
production growth for the sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. By contrast, Mozambique and 
Uganda,  countries  that  have  stable  and  open  maize  marketing  and  trade  policies  have 
experienced  more  than  100  percent  increase  in  maize  production  over  the  past  two 
decades. 
Second, Malawi and Zambia, countries pursuing interventionist and ad-hoc trade policies 
have highest price volatility and price uncertainty of all eight countries. This finding implies 
that ad hoc and discretionary the government policies in these two countries have had a 
destabilizing effect on prices and market predictability. 
Third, Mozambique, a country with the most liberalized markets in southern Africa has the 
lowest price variability in the capital city of Maputo, but the other markets, Nampula and 
Beira, have price volatility and market uncertainty closer to that of Malawi. This is likely 
because  markets  in  the  northern  part  of  Mozambique  are  integrated  with  markets  in 
Malawi; hence, policy instability in Malawi is likely to be transmitted into these markets.  
Fourth, maize price volatility has declined greatly in Kenya since its adoption of the maize-
without-border policy of the East African Community in January 2005. At this time, Kenya 
eliminated the variable tariffs on maize imported from Uganda and Tanzania (except for a 
2.75% inspection fee).  The more stable trade policy may have resulted in the decline of 
both price volatility and market uncertainty. 
Fifth,  there  is  no  apparent  relationship  between  being  on  a  coastal  port  versus  being 
landlocked in terms of the magnitude of maize price volatility.  
Sixth, in well functioning markets, there is a regular seasonal price pattern in which prices 
are lowest directly after the harvest and rise gradually over the season reflecting the costs 
of storage until they reach their peak in the months prior to the next harvest.  This pattern is 
seen in all eight countries studied, most clearly in Randfontein, South Africa. 
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In  summary,  these  findings  indicate  that  many  governments’  well-meaning  attempts  to 
stabilize prices actually destabilize them because marketing boards operations and sporadic 
border closings put a cloud of uncertainty over the maize market, depressing the long-term 
development of commercial markets.  In such an unpredictable environment, private trade 
develops more slowly and more tentatively in countries. While private trading systems will 
always result in some variation in food prices over time, as discussed in Section 2.2, they 
tend not to cause the frequent food crises due to policy mistakes and inaction that are 
commonly seen in the region.  The policy implications of these findings are discussed below 
in Section 7.4.  
6  Country case studies 
Sections 3-5 described the results of three studies of variability in staple food prices in sub-
Saharan Africa. This section focuses on the patterns and trends in staple food prices in seven 
countries of eastern and southern Africa, as well as the evolution of policies and programs 
designed to influence food prices.  Describing the seven countries illustrates the diversity of 
conditions and experiences, as well as highlighting some common characteristics and 
challenges.   
6.1  Ethiopia
6 
Ethiopia has a relatively diversified set of staple foods.  Maize and wheat are the most 
important staples, accounting for 20% of caloric intake each, followed by teff and sorghum.  
Teff  and  wheat  are  “luxury”  grains,  consumed  disproportionately  in  urban  areas,  while 
maize and sorghum are more common in rural areas.     
Cereals  play  a  significant  role  in  the  national  economy:  cereals  account  for  roughly  60 
percent of rural employment, 80 percent of total cultivated land, more than 40 percent of a 
typical household’s food expenditure, and more than 60 percent of the caloric intake. In 
terms of contribution to national income, our calculations suggest that the cereal sub-sector 
accounts for roughly 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This explains why both 
economic growth and poverty alleviation strategies of the government have placed so much 
emphasis on cereals.  
Continued policy emphasis on cereal has brought about significant changes in the structure 
and performance of the subsector. Production of wheat and maize has grown significantly 
since 2000—so much so that crop mix in the country has changed. Production of all four 
major cereals has increased significantly since the 1990s, with particularly strong growth in 
wheat and maize output.  Wheat has moved from being ranked last among the four major 
cereals  in  the  1990s  to  second  in  recent  years,  with  its  production  exceeding  teff  and 
sorghum.  
Despite this impressive growth, all cereals except wheat remain non-tradable. That is, given 
the  infrastructure  and  other  market  fundamentals,  large-scale  imports  and  exports  of 
cereals are not profitable in Ethiopia, though small volumes are involved in cross-border 
trade. On the other hand, almost one-third of the wheat consumed in Ethiopia is imported, 
though this is mostly in the form of food aid rather than commercial imports.  
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Domestic  marketing  remain  very  important  in  the  country  due  to  concentration  of 
production  in  two  regions—Amhara  and  Oromia—which  account  for  87  percent  of  the 
nation’s teff and wheat production and 82 percent of maize production. Therefore, inter-
regional  trade  of  cereal  remain  critically  important,  and  public  policies  focusing  on 
improving arbitrage efficiency can have a high pay off. 
Cereal markets in Ethiopia have gone through dramatic shifts over the past three decades, 
with each shift bringing about significant changes in agricultural price polices. The major 
thrust of the current government’s policy has been on (a) enhanced investments in market 
infrastructure, (b) gradual withdrawal of government controls, and (c) enhancing the scope 
and coverage of social safety net programs. This is line with government’s strategy to make 
transition from relief to development. The largest safety net program in Ethiopia is now 
conditional transfer programs, which not only feed the poor but also contribute towards 
growth through infrastructural and human capital development (nutrition supplement and 
school feeding).  
However, policy makers do not seem to be convinced that staple foods can yet be left to the 
market forces yet. The EGTE has continued ad hoc market interventions in recent years. The 
interventions, however, have been designed largely to address emergencies. For example, 
although  it  officially  withdrew  from  market,  government  instructed  EGTE  to  make  local 
purchases in 2003 when maize prices collapsed. Similarly, in the wake of very high domestic 
prices,  EGTE  imported  more  than  half  a  million  tons  of  wheat  in  2008,  which  were 
distributed through the urban food rationing program, open market sales, and sales to flour 
mills. The objective was to stabilize prices.  
During the 2007-09 global food crisis, staple food prices increased in Ethiopia, but it seems 
that the increase was not related to world price rise. It began with rapid growth in the 
money  supply  relative to  overall  economic  growth.  This  was  later  aggravated  a  modest 
harvest  in  2007.  Although  official  statistics  suggested  a  bumper  harvest,  an  IFPRI-EDRI 
gathers several indicators which suggest that official figures were overestimated.  Grain 
imports would have been able to stabilize food prices, but rising fuel prices and a fixed 
exchange rate resulted in government rationing of foreign exchange. This prevented traders 
from importing grain and caused domestic grain prices to rise above import parity prices. 
Food prices have remained high in spite of the decline in world food prices.    
Taking all the factors together, it appears that that rising food prices in Ethiopia has been 
the outcome of monetary policy misalignment, the balance of payment problems resulting 
from  sharp  increases  in  fuel  prices,  as  well  as  a  supply  shortfall  that  was  disguised  by 
overestimated cereal production. However, although the sources of price rise have been 
different  from  the  other  countries,  the  policy  reactions  have  been  similar—increased 
intervention in cereal markets.  
6.2  Uganda
7 
Uganda is a densely populated, landlocked country with a population of about 32 million.  
The diet of Ugandan consumers is unusual, both because of the diversity of staples and the 
relatively small importance of grains.  The most important staple is plantains (also called 
matooke or cooking bananas), but it represents just 18% of caloric intake.  Cassava, maize, 
sweet potatoes, and beans each contribute another 6-13%.  Rice and wheat are relatively 
                                                      
7  This section is based on Haggblade and Dewina, 2009. Staple food price variation in eastern and southern Africa   Page 14 
 
unimportant at the national level, but they are more popular among high-income, urban 
households.  
Most of the staple crops in Uganda are non-tradable.  There is very little trade in plantains, 
cassava, and sweet potatoes, although there are reports of cross-border exports of plantains 
to southern Sudan.  There is significant cross-border exports of maize and beans to Kenya, 
Rwanda, and Sudan. In addition to the small but growing exports of maize, Uganda, the 
World Food Programme has been buying maize for distribution as food aid in  northern 
Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia.  
Maize prices in Uganda are generally higher, more seasonal, and more volatile than the 
SAFEX price in South Africa and the US yellow maize price.  Although maize markets within 
Uganda are integrated with each other, they are not integrated with international prices.  
This is to be expected given the lack of international trade in maize, with the exception of 
cross-border  trade.  On  the  other  hand,  rice  prices  in  Uganda  do  not  show  a  strong 
seasonality and seem to be linked to international rice prices.  This is not surprising given 
that 42% of local rice supplies are imported.   
Ugandan  policy  with  regard  to  staple  foods  is  relatively  non-interventionist.    Perhaps 
because of the relatively minor importance of maize in Uganda compared to other countries 
in the region, maize prices are not a politically sensitive issue.  Thus, there is little pressure 
for the government to stabilize maize prices through trade restrictions and operations by a 
marketing board. Indeed, the government has explicitly stated its interest in becoming a 
local supplier of food, particularly maize and beans.   
During the global food crisis of 2007-2008, food prices rose significantly in Uganda.  Rice and 
wheat prices appear to be driven up by higher prices on international markets.  However, 
the price of maize and beans were probably more influenced by the post-election violence 
and poor rainfall in Kenya, which affected agricultural production there and increased the 
demand for food exports from Uganda.  In addition, an increase in food demand from Sudan 
is said to have put upward pressure on Ugandan prices.   
6.3  Kenya
8 
Kenya has a somewhat higher income and a relatively large manufacturing and services 
sector compared to its neighbors in the region.  As a result, the share of agriculture in GDP is 
relatively low, 21%.  Achieving productivity growth in staple crops is likely to be necessary 
but not sufficient for broad‐based and pro‐poor agricultural growth in Kenya.  
Maize is the most important staple food in Kenya, accounting for  36% of caloric intake.  
Wheat and beans are also important staples, contributing 9% and 5% respectively to the 
total. These figures indicate a relatively diversified diet compared to other countries in the 
region, which is partly a reflection of the higher income.  Wheat and rice are preferred 
staples, consumed disproportionately among urban and high-income households.    
Food imports are becoming increasingly important in Kenya.  The country is largely self-
sufficient in maize, though there are cross-border imports from Uganda and Tanzania, as 
well as imports from South Africa. Impediments to regional maize trade make it easier for 
large  millers  and  traders  to  source  maize  from  international  markets  rather  than  from 
smallholder  farmers  in  neighboring  countries.  Wheat  and  rice  are  mainly  imported 
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commodities, with imports contributing 63% and 87% of domestic requirements in recent 
years.  Domestic  wheat  production  is  carried  out  primarily  by  large-scale  commercial 
farmers.  Because of rising income and urbanization, preferences are slowly shifting toward 
rice and wheat, suggesting that grain imports are likely to grow over time.   
The real price of maize in Kenya has declined markedly since 1995 as the NCPB has partially 
withdrawn from the maize market. However, real prices of maize, wheat and almost all 
other crops rose dramatically with the world food crisis of 2007-08 and Kenya’s particular 
food crisis in 2008-09. While food prices in world markets peaked in July 2008 and started 
declining thereafter, food prices in Kenya started skyrocketing in mid‐2008 and exceeded 
the import parity price for much of 2009. This mainly reflects policy decisions to maintain a 
50% tariff on maize imports long after the need for major grain imports was realized in 
mid‐2008.  
In  the  period  between 1995  and  2005,  the  NCPB’s  activities  were  found  to  reduce the 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation of market prices, consistent with its stated 
mandate of price stabilization. It has successfully raised market prices in bumper crop years 
and  exerted  downward  pressure  on  market  prices  in  drought  years  (with  the  notable 
exception of 2008-09), mainly through its price setting operations. The treasury costs of the 
NCPB  maize  trading  account  in  recent  years  are  not  immediately  available  but  in  the 
controlled marketing period of the late 1980s, they were estimated at roughly 5% of Kenya’s 
GDP.   
Maize productivity growth will remain a crucial objective. If it can be achieved, it will reduce 
import dependence and remain a source of dynamism and growth for both rural and urban 
areas  in  the  region.  For  farms  that  satisfy  the  joint  conditions  of  being  located  in 
agro‐ecologically  suitable  areas  and  cultivating  enough  land  to  overcome  relatively  low 
returns per unit of land, maize will remain a dominant cash crop, as for many of the farms in 
districts such as Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Lugari, and Nandi. For farmers in most other areas 
(the  majority  of  which  are  purchasers  of  maize),  lower  costs  of  acquiring  maize  will 
encourage  the  commercialization  of  smallholder  agriculture  toward  higher‐valued 
commodities – a major source of productivity growth.  
6.4  Tanzania
9 
The main staple foods in Tanzania are maize (33% of caloric intake) and cassava (13%), with 
rice, sorghum, and wheat playing smaller roles.  Rice and wheat are preferred staples, being 
disproportionately important in urban areas and among high-income households.  
Tanzania is essentially self-sufficient in maize, although there are occasional cross-border 
exports from  the  main surplus zone  in  the  southern  highlands  to  northern  Zambia  and 
Malawi.  There is little or no trade in cassava and sorghum.  On the other hand, the country 
relies on imports for 8% of its rice and 91% of its wheat requirements.  
Over the last five years, there does not appear to be a very close connection between world 
prices and domestic markets for maize, sorghum, and rice.  This is not surprising in the case 
of maize and sorghum, since there is little international trade, but it is somewhat surprising 
in  the  case  of  rice.    One  hypothesis  is  that  administrative  procedures  required  for  rice 
imports make it difficult for importers to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. 
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On the other hand, food prices in different markets of Tanzania do appear to move together 
in response to weather-related supply shocks.  Price seasonality is what would be expected 
given the harvest schedule, though there is considerable variation from year to year.  Price 
differences between markets also follow expectations, with the surplus regions having the 
lowest prices and deficit regions having the highest prices.  There is some evidence that 
spatial margins declined over the reform period, presumably due to improved competition, 
though  food  price  volatility  may  have  increased.    A  more  in-depth  analysis  would  be 
required  to  test  whether  the  spatial  margins  and  seasonal  differences  correspond  to 
marketing and storage costs, respectively. 
Food  policy  in  Tanzania  is  largely  liberalized,  with  most  of  the  state  enterprises  and 
cooperatives created in the 1960s and 1970s dismantled or reduced in size and mandate. 
The country does maintain a strategic grain reserve, but the annual transactions are small 
relative  to  the  volumes  of  grains  marketed.  One  significant  intervention  in  staple  food 
markets is the frequent bans on maize exports, significantly limiting the ability of maize 
surpluses in the southern highlands from being exported to deficit zones in northern Malawi 
and Zambia.  Another important intervention is a large voucher scheme recently launched, 
which will provide subsidized fertilizer and seed to a significant share of Tanzanian farmers. 
6.5  Zambia
10  
Maize  is  by  far  the  most  important  staple  food  in  the  diet  of  Zambian  consumers, 
accounting  for  57%  of  caloric  intake.    This  percentage  is  the  highest  among  the  seven 
eastern and southern African countries being examined here. Cassava and wheat are also 
important  staples,  contributing  13%  and  7%  of  caloric  intake,  respectively.    Wheat  is  a 
preferred staple and is consumed disproportionately by urban and high-income households.  
Zambia is mainly self-sufficient in maize, but it imports about 5% of its requirements on 
average.  There is virtually no recorded international trade in cassava, presumably due to 
the low value-bulk ratio and the perishability of the fresh root.  Zambia imports 38% of its 
wheat  requirements,  the  remainder  being  produced  locally,  primarily  by  large-scale 
commercial farmers.   
Volatility in maize production and in maize prices drives food policy in Zambia. Following an 
initial liberalization of maize markets in the early 1990’s, following the bankruptcy of the 
government  marketing  parastatal  NAMBOARD,  the  Zambian  government  has  gradually 
resumed  a  larger  and  larger  role  in  maize  markets.  Government  also  routinely  controls 
maize and wheat imports and exports through quantitative restrictions imposed under the 
Control of Good Act. Cassava, however, remains largely unregulated.  
As an intermittent surplus producer and periodic importer of maize, Zambia would seem 
poised to benefit from regional trade opportunities, as an exporter in some years and an 
importer in others. Unpredictable policies (in particular, uncertainties over import quotas, 
tariffs  and  FRA  release  prices)  have  discouraged  private  maize  trade.  This,  in  turn,  has 
reinforced government suspicion that they cannot rely on private traders to supply food 
markets during crisis years, a sentiment that has fueled the renewed dominance of the FRA 
and government trade controls. This mutual caution and mistrust, between government and 
private traders, has resulted in periods (such as 2002 and 2003) when domestic maize prices 
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have exceeded import parity. As a result, Zambian food prices have fluctuated more than 
necessary in some years.  
In the medium run, price moderation through regional trade will require improved efficiency 
among marketing agents as well as transparent and predictable policy signals. Over the long 
run,  consumption diversification  out  of  maize and  into  wheat  and  cassava-based foods, 
feeds and beverages will tend to reduce Zambia’s current vulnerability to its erratic maize 
harvests, policies and maize prices. 
6.6  Malawi
11 
Maize is overwhelming the most important staple food in Malawi.  It accounts for 54% of 
the caloric intake, a close second behind Zambia among the seven countries examined here.  
Cassava and sweet potatoes each contribute 7-8% of caloric intake.   
Malawi is an occasional importer and exporter of maize, though the volumes are less than 
6%  of  production  on  average.    Until  recently,  Malawi  imported  maize  regularly  from 
northern  Mozambique.    In  recent  years,  large  harvests  have  allowed  government-to-
government exports of maize to Zimbabwe and other countries in the region.  There is 
virtually no recorded trade in cassava and sweet potatoes, probably because of the low 
value-bulk ratio of these crops.   
The agricultural economy of Malawi has four characteristics that make managing food prices 
particularly  difficult.    First,  the  diet  is  heavily  dependent  on  maize,  this  commodity 
accounting for over half of the caloric intake.  This means that food security is closely tied to 
the harvest of one crop.  Second, Malawi is landlocked, so imports and exports face high 
costs of transport.  This creates a wide band between import and export parity prices within 
which  domestic  prices  can  fluctuate,  although  cross-border  trade  with  Tanzania  and 
Mozambique lowers the effective import parity price to some degree.  Third, the unimodal 
rainfall pattern means that the seasonal fluctuation in prices is greater than in some other 
countries in the region such as Kenya and Uganda.  And fourth, the high population density, 
small farms, and low level of income of farmers, even by African standards, mean that many 
rural households are one bad harvest away from hunger and deprivation.  As a result, maize 
price volatility is higher in Malawi than elsewhere in the region, and the volatility has serious 
implications for food security.  
Studies of market integration in Malawi suggest that 1) market liberalization has improved 
the degree of integration between major towns in the country, 2) the major towns are 
integrated with each other with relatively rapid adjustment, suggesting functioning markets, 
and 3) smaller and more remote town remain disconnected from national markets.   
The  evolution  of  food  policy  in  Malawi  reveals  a  somewhat  erratic  process  of  market 
liberalization.  ADMARC lost its monopoly over grain trade in 1989 and it role in enforcing a 
price band in 2000, but the monopoly was temporarily restored in response to the food 
crisis of 2007-08.  Similarly, food price controls were eliminated in the 1980s but reinstated 
in 2008 (though not fully enforced).  Fertilizer policy has also experience numerous changes 
and reversals.   
The fertilizer subsidy program has been credited with four consecutive bumper harvests in 
maize  (2006-09).    Critics  point  out  that  it  has  largely  displaced  the  private  distribution 
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network, that the costs may be unsustainable, and that the 2007 harvest was probably 
overestimated, but it is popular in the country and is being adopted by a number of other 
African countries.  
On the other hand, the parallel commercial operations of traders and the government have 
created problems.  In 2001, the sale of subsidized maize and the plans for public-sector 
maize imports inhibited private imports, creating a serious shortage when ADMARC stocked 
out and government imports were delayed.  In 2004, fertilizer imports were stalled by a 
when government plans to launch the new subsidy program were delayed and scaled back.  
Experience suggests that private traders can play a useful role in importing maize during 
shortages, thus putting a ceiling on maize prices, but only if they can be reassured they will 
not be competing with subsidized government imports.  One the main challenges facing 
policymakers  in  Malawi  is  to  design  a framework  for  public  sector  intervention  in  food 
markets  which  is  flexible  enough  to  allow  it  to  respond  to  emergencies,  yet  limited, 
transparent,  and  predictable  enough  to  provide  the  private  sector  with  a  business 
environment that will favor trade, storage, and marketing investment.   
6.7  Mozambique
12 
Unique  among  the  seven  countries  under  consideration,  cassava  is  the  most  important 
staple  crop  in  Mozambique,  accounting  for  36%  of  the  caloric  intake  of  the  average 
consumer. It is followed closely by maize, which contributes 24% of the total.  Wheat and 
rice account for 7% each, though, being preferred staples, their importance is greater in 
urban areas and among high-income households.   
Mozambique  imports  about  12%  of  its  maize  consumption  requirements,  while  also 
exporting about 12% of its maize production.  This apparent contradiction is explained by 
regional differences within the country.  Northern Mozambique is a surplus maize area, with 
occasional cross-border exports to Malawi.  In contrast, southern Mozambique is a maize 
deficit zone, relying on local supplies during the local harvest season and relying on imports 
from South Africa in the off-season.   
There is virtually no recorded trade in cassava.  It is mainly produced in the north and center 
of the country.  Farmers there consider maize to be a cash crop, while producing cassava for 
home consumption.  Wheat and rice are largely imported commodities.  Virtually all (99%) 
of the country’s wheat requirements are imported, while about two thirds of its rice is 
imported.   
Mozambican consumers show a willingness to shift among the basic consumption staples 
according to relative prices, both in urban and rural areas. That flexibility helps to cushion 
world  price  shocks,  where  locally  produced  cassava  is  available,  but  in  the  southern 
provinces, where most staples are imported, high world prices have strong effects on urban 
consumers.  
Mozambique has been committed to open borders, allowing exports to neighboring 
countries, resulting in maize prices in northern Mozambique that are closely tied to those in 
southern Malawi. If Malawi or other neighbors close their borders to trade, there may be 
possible actions from the Mozambican side to limit trade as well, negatively affecting 
Mozambican producers and traders in the surplus zones of the north.  Food price 
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movements in southern Mozambique are not closely related to those in northern 
Mozambique, but they do follow price changes in South Africa.   
Overall, staple food price volatility in Mozambique tends to be less than in neighboring 
countries, but increased price problems can be expected if regional trade policies remain in 
flux and if agricultural subsidy programs are used for short term gains in production without 
sufficient investments in agricultural marketing. 
Government investments in roads and other infrastructure will need to continue with strong 
support from donors to enable trading systems to operate efficiently and to encourage the 
entrance of new agents in trading and processing. Analysis of prices indicates increasing 
market integration among markets in the country, as well as with markets in the region. 
Farmers will need to develop more productive crop management systems, and will need to 
adapt  as  climate  challenges  increase  to  avoid  increasing  risks  and  price  volatility.  This 
requires also public and private sector support for technology development and diffusion. It 
remains to be seen if government direct investment in storage facilities and in food reserve 
stocks will provide a solid basis for food security and have any impact on seasonal price 
fluctuations.  
7  Policy implications 
What do the findings described in this paper mean for the design of effective policies and 
programs to improve food market efficiency and reduce spatial and temporal variation in 
staple food prices?  This section begins with an overview of the criteria for government 
intervention, based on the discussion in Section 2.  Then we consider policies to reduce 
spatial price variation, based on the results from Section 3.  Next, there is an assessment of 
policies for reducing vulnerability to volatility in world prices, based on the results from 
Section 4. Finally, we consider the policy implications for reducing temporal variation in 
staple food prices, that is, food price volatility, based on Section 5.  
7.1  Criteria for government intervention 
Under what conditions is government intervention justified? Government intervention may 
be able to improve the performance of markets if there are market failures, defined as 
distortions in markets which make them work sub-optimally.  If farmers and/or traders do 
not have good information about market conditions, they will be unable to make informed 
decisions, reducing market performance.  Mobile phone technology has probably increased 
the  flow  of  market  information,  but  farmers  still  lack  access  to  information  they  need, 
particularly in more remote areas of sub-Saharan Africa.  Even with perfect information, it is 
possible for markets to be distorted if traders are able to collude in setting prices. When this 
happens,  trader  margins  are  larger  than  necessary,  which  reduces  producer  prices  and 
raises consumer prices. As discussed below, many studies show that that price differences 
are largely explained by transportation costs and normal profits.  In cases where trader 
profits appear large, it is difficult to know whether this reflects non-competitive markets or 
a large risk premium associated with working in an unpredictable environment.  
In addition, government intervention may be justified on equity grounds.  Even perfectly 
functioning food markets will not necessary deliver food to households who need it but lack 
the necessary purchasing power. This problem is particularly acute in cases of natural or 
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However, government interventions must be designed taking into account the limitations of 
public  sector  institutions.    This  means  focusing  food  policy  efforts  on  1)  promoting 
transparent  and  competitive  food  markets  through  market  information  systems, 
standardized weights and measures, and grades and standards, 2) investing in public goods 
infrastructure  such  as  roads,  the  rail  network,  market  places,  the  legal  system,  and 
agricultural research, and 3) establishing a safety net system that addresses chronic poverty 
as  well  an  emergency  relief  system  for  natural  disasters.    Below,  we  discuss  policy 
implications for reducing spatial and temporal variability in staple food prices.   
7.2  Implications for policies to reduce spatial variation in staple food prices 
Based on the review of spatial variation in staple food prices (Rashid and Minot, 2009), what 
are  the policies  and  investments that  will  make  agricultural  markets more  efficient?    It 
should be noted that none of the studies reviewed provide a cost-benefit analysis that 
would be needed to demonstrate beyond a doubt the value of these measures.  However, 
they do provide information on the types of policies that would reduce marketing costs and 
further  integrate  markets.  Rashid  and  Minot  (2009)  identify  the  following  policy 
implications: 
  Continue the process of agricultural market liberalization.  Five of the seven studies 
examining  this  issue  concluded  that  agricultural  market  liberalization  had  improved 
spatial market integration or reduced marketing margins.   
   Streamline administrative border procedures.  One of the most comprehensive studies 
of the transport sector in sub-Saharan Africa concluded that administrative barriers are 
at least as important an obstacle as poor roads, particularly in West and Central Africa.  
One such step would be to explore the feasibility of regional or continent-wide uniform 
truck registration. 
  Promote competition in the transport industries.  Marketing costs are lower in countries 
and  regions  where  the  demand  for  transport  services  is  dense,  leading  to  more 
competition. Competition can be promoted by reducing administrative and regulatory 
barriers to entry into the transport industry and eliminating protection for local trucking 
companies. 
  Improve  market  information,  particularly  with  the  use  of  information  and 
communication technology. Strong evidence from Niger suggests that mobile phones 
can improve market efficiency, and economic theory supports the government support 
in the provision of public goods such as market information.  
  Strengthen  institutions  that  facilitate  contract  enforcement.  The  objective  could  be 
pursued by  a)  establishing  small-claims  courts, b)  establishing  a  commercial  code of 
conduct  and  peer-review  mechanisms,  or  c)  promoting  mediation  through  trader 
associations. 
  Improve transportation infrastructure.  This is less important where there are still high 
administrative  and  policy  barriers  to  trade,  but  becomes  more  important  as  these 
barriers are reduced or eliminated.  
  Make government intervention in staple food markets predictable and modest.  Any 
government  intervention  creates  some  uncertainty,  but  this  can  be  minimized  by 
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operations.  Transparency about public stocks and planned interventions would also be 
useful. 
  Reduce barriers to international and cross-border grain imports.  Sharp price hikes in 
Ethiopia,  Kenya,  and  Malawi  could  have  been  avoided  by  reducing  barriers  to  food 
imports by private traders.    
  Seek  regional  agreements  to  limit  food  export  bans.    Many  African  countries 
implemented food export bans during the 2007-08 food crisis.  These policies were not 
successful  in  keeping  food  prices  down  and  exacerbated  the  crisis  in  landlocked 
countries.    Although  it  is  politically  difficult  for  an  individual  country  to  allow  food 
exports when prices are high, African countries have a collective interest in maintaining 
open borders. For this reason, this policy objective needs to be tackled at a regional 
level.   
These measures will not eliminate spatial variation in prices (nor would this be desirable in 
any case), but they would reduce transport costs and possibly trader profits, thus shrinking 
the gap between the price farmers receive for staple food crops and the price consumers 
pay for them.   
7.3  Implications for policies to reduce vulnerability to world food price volatility  
The global food crisis of 2007-08 has understandably shaken confidence in the stability and 
reliability of world food markets.  In many countries, it has sparked renewed interest in food 
self-sufficiency, trade barriers, and strategic grain reserves.  
Minot (2009c) concluded that the international prices of food grains do have an impact on 
African markets for rice, wheat, and (to a lesser degree) maize, but the effect is usually 
swamped by influence of weather-related domestic supply shocks.  The spike in world prices 
in 2007-08 was more clearly transmitted to African markets, partly because it was a large 
shock, partly because it was accompanied by sharply higher transportation costs, and partly 
because many African countries attempted to ban grain exports in response to the emerging 
crisis, thus exacerbating food price increases in landlocked countries.      
In  light  of  these  findings,  an  obvious  question  is:  how  can  African  countries  reduce 
vulnerability to fluctuations in world food prices?  The simplest answer is staple food self-
sufficiency, but how is this to be achieved.  One approach would be to invest in agricultural 
research, extension, disease control, and methods for reducing post-harvest losses.  Based 
on numerous studies of the returns to agricultural research, this would probably be a good 
investment regardless of the net trade position of the country in staple foods and regardless 
of whether it succeeded in achieving self-sufficiency.  But it would be a long-term strategy, 
which limits its appeal in the political arena.  The likelihood of success varies by crop: for 
maize, it would be feasible given that most African countries are 90-95% self-sufficient in 
maize already.  For rice and wheat, the rate of self-sufficiency could be increased, but, for 
most eastern and southern African countries, yield improvements alone are not likely to be 
enough to reach self-sufficiency
13.   
Another approach, probably more appealing in the short term, is to restrict imports through 
tariffs, quotas, or a full-scale import ban.  If enforceable, these policies will increase the rate 
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of “self-sufficiency” quickly at no cost to the government, but it would raise the price of 
staple foods  significantly,  probably  above the  levels  experienced during  the  global food 
crisis.  Since rice and wheat imports continued during this period, the “self-sufficiency” price 
must be still higher. This means that avoiding vulnerability to a spike in world grain prices 
like  the  one  in  2007-08  could  require  keeping  grain  prices  at  or  above  that  level 
permanently.  Clearly, this would have serious adverse effects on food security, particularly 
among the urban poor. 
In addition, staple food self-sufficiency would not eliminate food price volatility; rather it 
will decrease volatility due to international markets but increase volatility due to domestic 
supply shocks.  The key question is whether price volatility due to domestic supply shocks 
would be greater or less than volatility due to international grain markets. Although more 
in-depth analysis would require trade modeling beyond the scope of this study, several 
pieces of evidence suggest that price volatility
14 due to domestic supply shocks is as large or 
larger than volatility due to international markets: 
  The price of maize in South African commodity markets is more stable than the price of 
maize in most other sub-Saharan African countries.  
  The import parity price of maize in sub-Saharan Africa is more stable than the domestic 
price of maize in most sub-Saharan African countries.   
  In markets of sub-Saharan Africa, the price of rice (a largely tradable grain) is more 
stable than the price of maize (a largely non-tradable grain).  
As discussed above, the global food crisis was exacerbated when several major exporters 
restricted grain exports in response to the rising prices
15.  As food-importers, the countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa have a strong interest in limiting this kind of behavior.  One way to do 
this would be to lobby the World Trade Organization and other international bodies to limit 
food export restrictions as part of multi-lateral trade agreements.   
Similarly, the effects of another spike in world food prices could be ameliorated if African 
countries themselves were able to restrain from banning grain exports whenever prices rise.  
Although these bans are understandable from the perspective of an individual country, the 
combined effect of many countries doing this is to exacerbate the price spike, particularly 
for landlocked and food-importing countries. Given this situation, the implication is that any 
effort to prevent food export bans would have to be carried out at the regional level rather 
than at the national level.  In addition, an effort by African countries to discipline food 
export restrictions at the global level would be more persuasive if these countries  were 
undertaking similar measures at the regional level.   
The  experience  of  Ethiopia,  Malawi,  and  other  countries  indicates  that  grain  prices 
occasionally exceed the import parity price because of 1)  the rationing of foreign exchange 
to prevent depreciation of the currency, 2) the inability of traders to obtain food import 
permits, and 3) uncertainty regarding the government’s intentions regarding food imports.  
The policy implications are as follows: 
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  Either allow the currency to depreciate in order to avoid foreign exchange shortages 
that constrain food importers or (as a second-best solution) give priority to food imports 
in rationing foreign currency.   
  Remove the requirement that importers obtain permits to import food grains, although 
they  should  be  required  to  register  the  order  for  data  collection  and  transparency 
purposes.      
  Governments need to provide a clear and predictable environment for traders to make 
decisions. One approach would be for the government to withdraw from the business of 
trading in food grains. If this is not politically feasible, the government needs to be as 
transparent  as  possible  in  its  trading  decisions.    Subsidized  sales  of  grain  by  the 
government  should  be  targeted  to  poor  and  vulnerable  groups  rather  than  made 
available to, for example, all urban consumers.   
In the longer term, African governments can promote resilience to volatility in international 
grain prices by diversifying the staple foods diet of consumers.  During the global food crisis, 
the domestic prices of cassava, sweet potatoes, and other non-tradable staple foods rose 
much  less  than  the  prices  of  rice,  wheat,  and  maize.    Having  a  diversified  diet  allows 
households to substitute toward less expensive staples when the price of one of them rises.  
Staple crop diversification can be promoted on the production side by investing in cassava 
and other root crops, particularly in the areas of developing disease-resistant varieties and 
distributing improved planting materials.  On the consumption side, efforts to develop and 
disseminate methods for processing root crops and non-tradable grains to increase shelf-life 
and make food preparation easier.  
7.4  Implications for policies to reduce volatility in staple food prices  
The results of Chapoto and Jayne (2009) are summarized above.  In this section, the policy 
implications of that study are presented.  The authors argue that a “maize without borders” 
policy may be an important part of overall maize government policy that has a potential to 
considerably stabilize maize price for both consumers and producers.  Open border policies 
protect  domestic  food  markets  against  domestic  shocks  by  allowing  more  food  to  be 
imported in times of shortage and exported in times of plenty. This study shows that more 
active intervention in maize markets has not helped Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi and 
Tanzania because trade barriers and changes in government policy tend to exacerbate price 
unpredictability. This has an effect of dampening investment in the maize sector. Embracing 
open border policies and relying on regional trade to stabilize maize prices could be a win-
win situation in terms of both efficiency and price instability.   
This does not mean that governments have no role to play in maize markets; indeed, they 
have an important role in providing market information, promoting competition, investing 
in  physical  infrastructure  and  other  public  goods,  encouraging  diversification  of  food 
consumption patterns, and improving rural financial markets to improve  the capacity of 
traders.   
For  example,  efficient  regional  trade  depends  on  the  long-run  development  of  key 
infrastructure, especially better road connections. In the short to medium term, however, 
policy and institutional changes can facilitate regional trade by becoming more rules-based, 
setting clear criteria for when changes in tariff rates or trade barriers will be instituted, and 
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phytosanitary standards) and bureaucratic (e.g., border crossing documentation).  
Given that governments in eastern and southern Africa are likely to continue intervening in 
food markets, promoting more “rules based” approaches to marketing and trade policy may 
reduce the level of policy uncertainty and the price instability associated with it. Greater 
policy stability may also contribute to broader grain market development.  Predictable and 
transparent rules governing state involvement in the markets would reduce market risks 
and enable greater coordination between private and public decisions in the market.   For 
the most part, addressing problems of policy uncertainty involve very little cost per se, but 
do require greater coordination and more efficient management of government operations.  
However,  policy  makers  may  feel  that  rules-based  and  non-discretionary  marketing  and 
trade policies entail a loss of control and autonomy – leaders are bound to act according to 
pre-defined rules and triggers.  Successfully addressing these dilemmas may lie at the heart 
of efforts to move to a new post-liberalization system in which governments retain the 
ability to influence prices to achieve national food security objectives but within a clear and 
transparent framework of credible commitment to support long run private investment in 
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